











 “Earth-shaking invention” 
“If Experience did not both Inform and Certify us, Who would believe, that a light black 
Powder should be able, being duly manag’d, to throw down Stone-Walls, and blow up whole 
Castles and Rocks themselves,” pondered natural philosopher Robert Boyle late in the 
seventeenth century.1 What shocked and intrigued Boyle, historian Haileigh Robertson notes, 
was not just the brute force of exploding gunpowder but the sense-defying rate of the reaction 
that took place.2 Upon ignition, he calculated, gunpowder expanded in an instant to some 
50,000 times the original size of its grains.3 While Boyle was seeking to unravel the 
mysteries of the volatile compound, the explosive power of gunpowder continued to wreak 
destruction. Death or grievous injury delivered at imperceptible speeds by incomprehensible 
forces was becoming part of European life.  
While speeds that defy the human senses have attracted much attention in the context 
of digital media, social thinkers engaging with environmental issues tend to reflect more on 
the challenges of slow and persistent change. Philosopher Isabelle Stengers urges her readers 
to embrace the painstaking working up of under-recognized problems rather than latching 
onto those blatantly disastrous events that already “have the power to force unanimous 
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recognition”.4 Likewise, literary studies scholar Rob Nixon would prefer us to be moved 
more by the “slow violence” of long-term environmental degradation and toxicity than by the 
eye-catching spectacle of “(f)alling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, 
volcanoes, and tsunamis.”5  
For social thinkers who are drawn to transformations at the planetary scale – the 
impacts on Earth systems and lithic strata announced by the Anthropocene hypothesis – the 
inclination to attend to deeply protracted processes can also be strong. Such concerns are 
often framed by acknowledgement that our home disciplines have insufficiently prepared us 
for the extremely longue durée. I suspect I’m not alone in feeling the pull and poignancy of 
paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould’s reflection that “(d)eep time is so difficult to comprehend, 
so outside our ordinary experience, that it remains a major stumbling block to our 
understanding.”6  
Yet developments in the Earth and life sciences over the last half century have also 
made it clear that there’s more to Earth history than immensely drawn-out timescales and 
durations: Gould’s own theory of punctuated equilibrium contributing significantly to the 
idea that biological evolution combines gradual and rapid change.7 With its focus on 
thresholds or tipping points in the operating state of planetary systems, Earth system science 
inherits and amplifies this concern with multiple tempos of transformation. In a related sense, 
the task of identifying synchronous and planet-wide impacts of human activity in the Earth’s 
rocky crust – required for the formalization of the Anthropocene hypothesis – is drawing 
geologists into engagement with changes far more rapid than most have previously reckoned 
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with. While it is still open to revision, the Anthropocene Working Group’s preferred 
candidate for a signal that marks the end of the Holocene is radionuclide fallout from post-
World War II testing of thermonuclear warheads.8 Which is to say that a panel comprised 
mostly of researchers who are “overwhelmingly concerned with ancient, pre-human rock and 
time” may well pivot its case for a new geological epoch around the consequences of events 
that are over in microseconds.9  
There is a backstory to the interest of Anthropocene exponents in big explosions. 
Atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen, who named and helped frame the Anthropocene concept, 
was one of the progenitors of the nuclear winter hypothesis. A nuclear war, he predicted, 
would result in massive wildfires generating photochemical smog that could “change the heat 
and radiative balance and dynamics of the earth and atmosphere” with devastating impact on 
surviving humans.10 This scenario was an important precursor of the idea that human action 
could not only impact on the overall Earth system but could do so abruptly. It’s also worth 
recalling that much of the scientific evidence leading to the confirmation of the plate tectonic 
hypothesis in the early 1960s came from seismographic stations set up to detect Cold War 
nuclear explosions. At the same time, tracking radioactive debris from nuclear weapons 
testing as it moved through the atmosphere, hydrosphere and biosphere made a major 
contribution to understanding the interconnectivity of the Earth system.11  
While a radionuclide marker may fulfil the criteria of a clear geosynchronous signal 
in nascent geological strata, Anthropocene scientists need to be careful about the way this 
evidence is framed and presented. Activists and their academic allies will likely ask what the 
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mobilisation of radioactive traces to authenticate an epochal scientific claim means for place-
based communities who have suffered the lasting ecological, physiological and psychic 
effects of superpower military-industrial competition – what its implications are for the 
Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, Aboriginal Australians, Kazaks, and others upon and 
above whose unceded customary lands atomic weapons were detonated. We can anticipate 
such questions because social thinkers and critical practitioners have already been taking the 
science of the Anthropocene to task for both inadequately considering its own situatedness 
and partiality, and for failing to give enough credence to a multiplicity of other ways of 
experiencing or knowing the Earth.12 In short, while social critics may affirm the need for 
disclosing the physical violation of planetary processes, they have called out Anthropocene 
science for its own implication in the epistemic violence that has long characterized 
encounters between the West and the wider world.13  
In this chapter, I take the event of the explosion as an occasion for engaging at once 
with physical and epistemic violence. But I want to put a twist on this by focusing not on the 
brutal era of European colonial conquest or the subsequent planet-threatening superpower 
rivalry, but on an earlier set of life-threatening encounters that are a condition of possibility 
of the heavily weaponized global histories that followed. There is no A-bomb without 
“conventional” explosive weapons, and there are no conventional missiles, bombs and guns 
without gunpowder. And this is a line of development that takes us far from Europe.  
Historians trace the discovery of a chemical mix that ignites rapidly enough to create 
an explosive release of energy to ninth century China.14 Not only did the Chinese concoct 
gunpowder, they also – decisively and extensively – realized its potential as a weapon. When 
 
12 See for example Eva Lövbrand, Silke Beck, Jason Chilvers, Tim Forsyth, Johan Hedrén, Mike Hulme, Rolf 
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historian Joseph Needham opens his magisterial forty-three year study of explosive technics 
with reference to the “earth-shaking invention of gunpowder,”15 he is well aware of the work 
of Boyle and compatriot researchers, and of the tumultuous impact of explosive weaponry on 
the battlefields of Europe. His primary concern, however, is with the invention and 
deployment of gunpowder in China.  
My aim here is to take the “earth-shaking” power of gunpowder quite literally – as 
Needham seems to have intended. In conceiving of the explosive force of gunpowder as a 
geologic or planetary event, I draw on certain insights of the contemporary Earth and life 
sciences. At the same time, by following weaponized gunpowder from East to West and 
tracking its experiential and subjective impacts on a pyrotechnically ingenuous Europe, I 
want partially to unsettle the epistemic confidence of the modern West that still underpins 
today’s big stories about the how the Earth works and what to do about it.  
My case for the geological eventfulness of gunpowder emerges out of what I take as a 
central provocation of Anthropocene geoscience for social thought: the incitement to think 
with and through a dynamic, self-differentiating Earth and to acknowledge that our species or 
genus is capable of bringing new kinds of functionality to the operation of this planet.16 More 
specifically, I pick up on writer Jack Kelly’s observation that the split-second combustion of 
gunpowder is an entirely new kind of fire: one that “does not exist anywhere in nature.”17 
Attending to gunpowder not simply as a significant juncture in military or technological 
history but as an event in planetary history helps us to grasp its potential for disrupting Earth 
and life processes. More than this, an appreciation of the utter novelty of explosive fire alerts 
us to the challenges it poses to the human sensorium and to the cultural or cosmological 
orderings through which subjects collectively seek to make sense of their worlds. And it is in 
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this regard, I argue – with the help of military and pyrotechnic historians – that the 
unexpected arrival of gunpowder weaponry and its compacted development in Europe 
relative to China had profound repercussions on European subjectivity and epistemic 
formations.  
I will not be making a case that the material traces of exploding gunpowder in either 
its military or civil applications would make a good marker for the onset of the 
Anthropocene. But I do want to suggest that thinking through the movement of a novel 
anthropogenic fire from East to West complicates the tenaciously Western-centered narrative 
of most Anthropocene science – while also potentially contributing to its laudable concern 
with planetary dynamism and change. In a related sense, I argue, facing up to the shock and 
trauma arising especially, but not uniquely, from the abbreviated experience of gunpowder in 
Europe, offers insights into the particular ways Europeans later amassed and unleashed 
firepower. Finally, circling back on questions of unfolding climatic and Earth system change, 
I suggest that the fraught experience of learning to function in proximity to the force of the 
explosion might offer clues about the apparent willingness of so many people to tolerate the 
threat of runaway planetary heating.  
 
Genealogy of the Explosion 
Philosopher Yuk Hui’s recent study of the relationship between cosmology and technology 
hinges around China’s humiliating defeat by the British in the mid-nineteenth century Opium 
Wars.18 As Hui depicts the Chinese experience of being outgunned by the European power: 
“(t)he two Opium Wars in the mid-nineteenth century had destroyed the civilisation’s self-
confidence, and thrown it into a whirlpool of confusion and doubt.”19 The extended period 
that followed became known in China as the century of humiliation. More immediately, Hui 
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recounts, some Chinese intellectuals responded to the rout of the Opium Wars with a slogan 
of “learning from the West to overcome the West.”20  
In an important sense, however, the West’s moment of military triumph was itself a 
learning from the East that eventually enabled a partial “overcoming” of the East. As Hui 
notes in passing and other scholars have examined in detail, gunpower was a Chinese 
invention that calamitously returned home, intensified and augmented, some half a 
millennium after it had found its way to Europe. While hardly cause to belittle a civilization, 
the idea that the Chinese squandered their concoction of volatile black powder on fireworks – 
widely circulated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – has been roundly dismissed as a 
myth that served to bolster Europe’s sense of its own technological bravado. “Early modern 
warfare” counters military historian Peter Lorge, “was invented in China during the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries.”21  
The conventional western narrative has it that ninth century Taoist alchemists 
stumbled across the volatile mixture while seeking elixirs of eternal life. However, neither the 
serendipitous nor the supernatural aspects of this storyline should go unquestioned.22 What 
we do know is that by combining charcoal, sulfur, and nitrates in the right proportion and 
exposing the mix to flame, researchers concocted a fire that burned with extreme speed. The 
pyrotechnic compound came to be known as huo yao or “fire drug” suggesting that medicinal 
uses were at least in contention.23 But Chinese military engineers, already masters of flaming 
arrows and other incendiary weapons, were quick to apply the exceptional flammability of 
the black powder to the demands of warfare.24  
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The escalation and differential development of explosive weaponry is a staple of 
military history. Historians and social theorists, however, have devoted less effort to situating 
gunpowder within a more general history of fire or combustion – perhaps reflecting a relative 
paucity of an integrative concern with fire in western thought. “Fire” is the vernacular term 
for the chain reaction, triggered by an ignition source, through which chemical energy is 
converted into thermal energy in an oxygen-saturated environment:25 “deflagration” being the 
technical term for the heat-releasing or exothermic process whereby heat produced ignites 
still more fuel.26  
In the case of gunpowder, sulfur and charcoal provide the volatile compound with 
fuel, producing heat that causes the nitrates found in saltpeter to let loose their oxygen atoms. 
In the right proportions, this release of pure oxygen accelerates the conversion of fuel into hot 
gas into a few thousandths of a second, resulting in deflagration of such rapidity that it has no 
natural equivalent.27 When this extremely high-speed exothermic reaction takes place in a 
confined space, the result is sudden, vigorous release of energy, or an “explosion.” Explosions 
routinely occur in the natural world, such as when volatile plant oils ignite during wildfires or 
when volcanoes build up uncontainable pressure, but like the split-second combustion that 
drives it, exploding gunpowder has no earthly predecessor. Indeed, with the help of 
environmental historian Stephen Pyne, we might think of near-instantaneous combustion and 
the rapid release of energy it entails as the first entirely new form of fire since terrestrial 
biomass began to burn during the Devonian Period some 400 million years ago.28 
Having first exploited its incendiary properties, Chinese military engineers began to 
explore both the propellant and explosive capabilities of huo yao. But as Lorge recounts, 
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progress was initially slow on both practical and conceptual levels. “The intellectual 
component is important,” he stresses, “because it required the acceptance of a completely 
new idea in weaponry: the explosion.”29 Once researchers began to embrace the multiple 
possibilities of split-second combustion, an extraordinary array of military uses for the 
pyrotechnic mixture was trialled – including gunpowder-delivering birds and kites, flaming 
rockets, exploding pots and flame-spouting lances. The names given to these weapons – 
“flying incendiary club for subjugating demons,” “ten-thousand fire flying sand magic 
bomb,” “burning heaven fierce fire unstoppable bomb” – convey at once the exuberance of 
this experimental wave and the shock effect they were intended to produce.30  
Over the turbulent centuries of the Song Dynasty this profusion of weaponry was 
narrowed down to what we would now recognise as guns, bombs, grenades, and rockets.31 As 
historian Tonio Andrade sums up: “in the hundred years from 1127 to 1279, the second part 
of the Song dynasty, human beings went from primitive gunpowder weapons like gunpowder 
arrows to a whole array of more sophisticated weapons, including fire lances, proto guns, 
and, by the end of the period, true guns.” 32	
As explosive weaponry was refined and standardized, so too did it begin to travel 
beyond its originary site. How guns and gunpowder reached Europe and the Islamic empires 
remains uncertain, though it seems likely that the expansion of Mongol rule over Eurasia 
played a part.33  Preceded by reports or hearsay of explosives, firearms seem to have arrived 
in Europe in the early 1300s. In the words of Needham: “all the long preparations and 
tentative experiments were made in China, and everything came to Islam and the West fully 
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fledged, whether it was the fire-lance or the explosive bomb, the rocket or the metal-barrel 
hand-gun and bombard.”34  
Informed by Pyne’s pyrocentric thinking, I am proposing that we view this event not 
simply as a case of accelerated technology transfer, but as the arrival of a novel kind of 
combustion: a fire not simply strange to Europeans but relatively new to the planet. Such a 
reading suggests the value of reversing Hui’s concern with the shockwave induced by 
European military technology in China in the nineteenth century – by inquiring into the 
impact of explosive firepower from China on a pyrotechnically naïve Europe. Or as Needham 
sagely concludes his study, in the early fourteenth century “the Western world was set upon 
the fateful road to all the techniques of managing explosions.”35 
 
Explosive Exposure  
It took time for the pyrotechnic powder arriving in Europe to fully ignite. Tracking the 
response of late medieval Europeans to the explosive mixture, historian Kelly DeVries 
suggests it was first apprehended as “a mysterious substance which imitated God’s power.”36 
As its use spread, scholars sought to integrate gunpowder more fully into the prevailing 
episteme – that encompassing field in which earthly processes mirrored heavenly ones, and 
the microcosm reflected the macrocosm.37 In the resultant accommodation, literary theorist 
Roy Wolper elaborates, “thunder and lightning are God’s presence in the sky; gunpowder is 
God’s presence on earth”38 – a reception aided by the uptake of the fiery explosion into the 
popular spectacle of firework displays.39 But as Wolper adds, gunpowder’s glaring 
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destructiveness grated against easy assimilation. By the early seventeenth century, natural 
philosopher Francis Bacon was actively recontextualizing the explosive powder. 
Transplanted from battlefield to laboratory, gunpowder came to figure more generally for the 
hidden potentials of nature that waited to be unbound by Bacon’s experimental method.40 
At the time when Bacon’s major works were published, gunpowder had been working 
its way into European warfare for almost three hundred years, and of late had nearly seen off 
the British Parliament. Needham relays what he sees as a rather timeworn narrative that 
gunpowder weaponry’s capacity to breech castle walls and unseat knightly cavalry played a 
significant role in the undermining of European military aristocratic feudalism. He is clearly 
more interested in reminding us “how unstable Western medieval society was in comparison 
with that of China”:41 a point later military historians have reinforced.  
Resonating with Needham, Lorge argues that while the weaponization of huo yao in 
China took place in the context of an extensive, centralized bureaucratic system that was 
already over a thousand years old, the late medieval Europe into which gunpowder found its 
way centuries later was a fractious throng of principalities and kingdoms. His more general 
point is that weapons alone, wherever they are deployed, do not transform a society or polity: 
what matters most are the forms of social organization through which military technologies 
are adopted, developed and deployed.42 As Lorge explains:  
 
The wealthy, mature, and stable societies of Asia, though subject to political 
developments and upheaval, gradually incorporated the new weaponry without great 
social change. Matters were much different in the poor, undeveloped, unstable 
societies of Europe. There the introduction of new weaponry coincided with a 
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dramatic period of demographic and economic growth, and political consolidation.43  
But this comparison leads Lorge to at least partially revise his own prioritization of socio-
political variables. For he goes on to suggest that in the European case the demands of 
gunpowder warfare actually pushed polities – unknowingly – in the direction of the 
bureaucratized institutions and logistical networks characteristic of China. “[I]t took the 
invention of systems and practices similar to those of China,” he concludes, “before 
European governments and armies began most fully to exploit the use of guns in war.”44  
What happens, then, if we take this idea of a certain convergence between emergent 
European governance systems and their much older Chinese predecessors and layer in the 
idea that the trigger event is a new form of terrestrial fire? Lorge is right to draw attention to 
the conceptual demands posed by the explosion as “a completely new idea in weaponry”, but 
the challenge is still more profound if we conceive of the coming of ultra-fast deflagration as 
an event in planetary history: as a novel elemental force with which certain human subjects 
have had to learn to coexist. And it is in this regard, I argue, that the greatly accelerated 
European encounter with split-second deflagration relative to the Chinese experience matters. 
Historians concerned with the transitions accompanying the full embrace of firearms 
by European armies have taken the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) as a turning point, with 
particular emphasis placed on the introduction of volley fire by linear rows of infantryman.45 
Both the growth in size of standing armies and the intensification of gunfire added their heft 
to a catastrophe that took the lives of some eight million combatants and civilians in Central 
Europe, including a third of Germany’s population. Philosopher Stephen Toulmin is far from 
alone in viewing the Thirty Years’ War as one of the most brutal and unremitting conflicts in 
 
43 Lorge, The Asian Military Revolution, 17. 
44 Lorge, The Asian Military Revolution, 81. 






European history.46 Toulmin proposes that the shockwave unleashed by this conflict was 
pivotal in a shift in European thought from the open-minded, inclusive and frequently 
sensuous humanism typical of the sixteenth century to the more abstract, defensive and 
constricted thinking of the seventeenth century. René Descartes’s dogmatic quest for 
certainty, he maintains, is emblematic of this narrowing of reason.47  
As Toulmin recounts, the Thirty Years’ War broke out when Descartes was in his 
early twenties and ended two years before his death.48 Curious about emergent military 
techniques and with an interest of his own in calculating the trajectory of moving bodies, 
Descartes joined Maurice of Nassau’s army at the opening of the war.49 He was subsequently 
present at the Battle of White Mountain where four thousand Protestant troops were 
slaughtered in an hour or so. It was a month before this engagement, on the night of 
November 10, 1619, that Descartes experienced the sequence of dreams that he himself 
viewed as the inspiration for his celebrated scientific method.50 As a contemporary 
biographer recounted: “He thought he heard a sudden, loud noise, which he took for thunder. 
Terrified, he immediately woke. Upon opening his eyes he noticed sparks of fire scattered 
about the room.”51  
Unsurprisingly, psychoanalytic thinkers have detected signs of post-traumatic stress 
in Descartes’s visions and connected his renowned mind-body dissociation to its wartime 
context. Noting the young serviceman-savant’s likely proximity to the discharge of explosive 
weapons, analyst Robert Withers adds that, being trained in medicine, he was also likely to 
have encountered the physiological damage inflicted by canon and musket.52 What these 
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considerations of Descartes’s personal experience bring to Toulmin’s more general account 
of repercussions of the Thirty Years’ War is the reminder that by the seventeenth century, 
physical and psychic exposure to explosive weaponry had become part of everyday life for 
many Europeans.  
Compared with Descartes’s subsequent drive for an unwavering, self-grounded 
cogito, Bacon’s championing of hands-on, experientially-led inquiry can come across as 
relatively modest53 – though we shouldn’t overlook his intimation that nature’s truth is 
revealed through violence. Science studies scholar Donna Haraway’s depiction of the 
Cartesian “god-trick” of scientific objectivity as a flight from the complications of 
embodiment, situatedness and responsibility to “a realm above the fray” may be even more 
apposite than intended.54 For fray it most certainly was – the relentless slaughter of the Thirty 
Years’ War encapsulating all the horrors that a fleshy, impressionable observer might wish to 
flee from. More than just exposing the human body and senses to a new kind of threat, we 
might see the weaponized explosion at this juncture as beginning to shape an entire milieu of 
shocks and forces.  
 “(T)he canon,” observes cultural historian Lewis Mumford, “was the first of the 
modern space-annihilating devices, by means of which man was enabled to express himself 
at a distance.”55 It’s important to keep in mind that whereas well-trained archers singled out 
targets, as late as the eighteenth century, historian Priya Satia insists, “firearms were for 
terrorizing at a distance with unpredictable fire.” 56 While much has been said about the role 
of breaking down battlefield operations into discrete, rehearsable gestures in the shaping of 
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the modern subject,57 the paradox of this disciplining process was that it centered on training 
combatants to function in an environment configured by largely random death or injury – 
including that inflicted by the malfunction of one’s own weapon.58 This is an experience 
novelist Andrew Miller imparts through the voice of an early nineteenth century British 
soldier: a brutal and brutalized infantryman who knows “what it was to stand in line while the 
enemy guns swept away the men on either side of you, made them non-men, butcher’s 
trash.”59  
When they did not kill outright, as “blooded” soldiers knew all too well, gunpowder 
weapons produced horrific injuries: “wounds that could not be stitched up neatly like blade or 
arrow wounds.”60 The damage was not all visible. Well before formal psychiatric recognition 
of post-traumatic stress disorder or the “war neurosis” diagnosed by Sigmund Freud after 
World War I, psychic disturbance resulting from fire-armed conflict was well documented.61 
In The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith conveyed a sense of shock and derangement 
that overflows the field of conflict when he wrote of the “noise of fire-arms, the smoke, and 
the invisible death to which every man feels himself every moment exposed … a long time 
before the battle can be well said to be engaged.”62  
Nothing I have been reporting here is meant to imply that Europeans exposed to 
explosive weaponry were uniquely sensitive to its effects. Warfare in the East was frequent, 
brutal, and large scale, and as Lorge concludes of China and neighbouring powers: “Asians 
were just as eager to kill each other with the most effective available weapons as were 
Europeans.”63 Europe’s nineteenth century superiority over China in firepower, as we will 
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shortly see, had a lot to do with timing. But the different ways that Europe and China 
absorbed and processed the experience of gunpowder warfare, I suggest, also has much to do 
broader and deeper “civilizational” framings of fire. And thinking through fire in this way, 
neither starts nor ends with gunpowder.  
 
The Field of Fire  
I have been broadly following Lorge’s argument that “(w)ithout the Chinese revolution in 
warfare there could not have been a European revolution.”64 While Europeans and the 
Chinese themselves have made much of western military supremacy in light of the disastrous 
encounters of the mid-nineteenth century, he maintains that the technological gap at the time 
was still relatively slight and that the success of British aggression owed more to the political 
disorganization of the Qing government.65 Where military disparities were most pronounced 
in the skirmishes of the first Opium War, some historians have argued, was in naval power. 
And much of this came down to the presence of the steam-powered gunboat Nemesis – whose 
shallow draught, manoeuvrability, and general efficacy as a “workhorse” looks to have been 
as significant as the armaments it carried.66  
This connection of gunpowder-based weapons with steam power is of great 
significance, not just for military or even social history but also for the still-unfolding history 
of the Earth. Just as Lorge and others have stressed the importance of situating weapons 
within their socio-institutional contexts, so too do we need to consider the social and 
civilizational framing of this novel planetary fire. This means opening up the complex issue 
of how Chinese researchers discovered a new mode of combustion in the first place. And in a 
roundabout way, it brings us to the issue of how Europeans came up with new ways of 
deploying an older kind of combustion.  
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As Needham stresses, incendiary devices and mixtures played a major role in warfare 
in China centuries before the invention of gunpowder.67 This in turn, he explains, was part of 
a more general concern with physico-chemical experimentation in which fire was a key 
element. Huo yao was one of many discoveries arising from a spree of pyrotechnical 
exploration that spanned at least six centuries, a research tradition in which there was no 
pronounced separation between medical, alchemical, military, and ceremonial applications of 
incendiary discoveries – as the term “fire drug” indicates.68 “Smokes, perfumes, 
hallucinogens, incendiaries, flames, and ultimately the use of the propellant force of 
gunpowder itself,” concludes Needham, “form part of one consistent tendency discernible 
throughout Chinese culture from the earliest times.”69 
We should also consider China’s early lead in high heat technology. By 1500 BCE, 
observes historian Jack Goody, Chinese artisans were attaining kiln temperatures well over 
1200°C. These unprecedented heat levels enabled manufacture of glazed stoneware and the 
casting of bronze and iron.70 An entire industrial complex took shape around these 
pyrotechnologies, Goody observes, characterized by “a large scale, labour-intensive chain of 
production, with ore-miners, fuel gatherers, ceramacists and foundry workers.”71 Only much 
later, he adds, did the high heat methods pioneered in China move westward. This 
millennium-and-a-half of developing high heat practice helped equip the Chinese with both 
the technical capabilities for channelling the force of explosive deflagration and the 
institutional foundations for the extensive capitalization of these capacities.72  
If only in a preliminary way, positioning gunpowder and the experiments from which 
it emerged in the longue durée of Chinese pyrotechnic exploration helps us to see why the 
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shockwaves of explosive warfare, alarming even in China, were still more difficult for 
Europeans to absorb. It’s worth recalling that despite recurrent hostilities in Europe, 
development of gunpowder weaponry was neither rapid nor inexorable – Kelly describing 
“the curious stasis that gripped military technology from the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 
1648 until well into the 1800s.”73 What may ultimately have been more consequential over 
this time are the more “existential” impacts I addressed in the previous section: the 
constricting of reason, the dissociation of mind and body, the hardening – we might even say 
brutalizing – of exposed subjects.74 For this is a matter of global significance. Capacities, 
dispositions, sensibilities that were honed and exercised in European domestic conflicts were 
also instrumental in Western colonial expansion.  
As I touched upon earlier, describing the movement of projectiles played a significant 
role in the development of Descartes’s scientific method: his interest in moving bodies falling 
somewhere Galileo’s insights on the parabolic curve traced by cannonballs and Newton’s 
extrapolation from projectiles to planetary motion. In this regard, Kelly argues, concern with 
the accuracy of artillery played a significant role in establishing the western scientific 
premise that the object world followed predictable pathways – although it took several 
centuries to markedly improve battlefield targeting.75 In relation to fire more generally, what 
we need to recognise here is the distance thought and practice is travelling from the idea that 
fire is a versatile force that transmutes matter to the association of explosive weaponry with a 
single, determinable trajectory.  
There is still a tendency, prevalent in Anthropocene scholarship, to put the stress on 
the massive expansion of power and capability that results from combusting fuels to drive 
heat engines. What the shift from a more metamorphic conception of fire to viewing 
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explosive fire as the driving force of linear motion brings into relief, however, is the profound 
narrowing or constriction that is taking place in the imaginary of fire.76 In the West, this 
momentous reduction reaches its fulfillment in the thermodynamic thinking that is closely 
associated with the ascent of new industrial heat engines. As physicist Ilya Prigogine and 
Isabelle Stengers observe:  
 
Fire transforms matter; fire leads to chemical reactions, to processes such as melting 
and evaporation. Fire makes fuel burn and release heat. Out of all this common 
knowledge, nineteenth century science concentrated on the single fact that 
combustion produces heat and that heat may lead to an increase in volume; as a result 
combustion produces work.77 
 
Yet historians have also noted more direct links between engines that use fire to do 
“work” in this restricted sense with the European experience of exploding gunpowder. As 
Mumford observed in the 1930s, “the gun was the starting point of a new type of machine: it 
was, mechanically speaking, a one-cylinder internal combustion engine.”78 Needham fills out 
this storyline – tracking a history of projects aimed at applying gunpowder to useful weight 
lifting or piston driving tasks that goes back at least as far as the early sixteenth century.79 
Scientist-inventor Christiaan Huygens’ project with the French Academy of Sciences in the 
1670s is pivotal. As Huygens wrote: 
The force of cannon powder has served hitherto only for very violent effects … and 
although people have long hoped that one could moderate this great speed and impetuosity to 
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apply it to other uses, no one, so far as I know, has succeeded.80  
It was Denis Papin, initially working under Huygens on the moteur à explosion, who 
recognized that steam power offered a “less violent” route to creating the vacuum that could 
drive a piston.81 Papin set research and development on a path towards external combustion – 
the use of fire-heated boilers to drive engines. Though not with gunpowder as its motive 
force, the internally combusting moteur à explosion would be momentously revived some 
two centuries later as the driving force of the automobile. But prior to the return of internal 
combustion, the external combustion of the steam-powered heat engine joined forces with 
gunpowder to devastating effect. 
As military historian Martin van Creveld explains: “(t)he invention of the steam 
engine … freed weapons from the limited power provided by horses, enabling their size, 
weight, and power to grow many times over.”82 Or in the case of a gunboat like Nemesis it 
greatly increased speed, work rate, and maneuverability. At the same time, steam power 
combined with explosive deflagration to dramatically accelerate mineral-energetic extraction. 
Steam engines pumped water from mines and transported extracted materials, and explosions 
opened up rock faces and facilitated large-scale infrastructural development.83 In turn this 
compounding of two distinct forms of combustion amplified the ability of western interests to 
forcibly gain access to the land and resources of other peoples across the globe. But we 
should also be mindful that the readiness to unleash this convergent and concentrated 
firepower on other life-worlds may itself manifest the tempering, brutalizing effect of the 
European subject’s intensive exposure to the explosive inferno.  
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Anthropocene Echoes of the Explosion 
As climate activist Greta Thunberg famously exhorted world leaders: “I want you to panic … 
I want you to act as if our house is on fire.”84 Timely words. But we might ask whether the 
apparent willingness of certain sectors of the global population to dwell in the shadow of a 
rapidly heating planet bears some relationship to several centuries of painful accommodation 
to an explosive milieu; to the risk of having their “house” not merely burnt down but blown 
apart.  
It’s worth recalling that the historical juncture which Anthropocene scientists identify 
as the most likely threshold of the new geological epoch immediately follows the endpoint of 
what Andrade refers to as “the European warring states period” that he sees as stretching 
from 1450 to 1945.85 By the time that a half-millennium of recurrent conflict came to a close, 
Europe’s explosive firepower had reached such levels that entire populations found 
themselves inhabiting, in Walter Benjamin’s words, “a field of force of destructive torrents 
and explosions: a total environment of bomb blasts and firestorms capable of reducing entire 
cities to ash and rubble.86  
Slow violence may be important, I’ve been arguing, but we still have work to do to 
make sense of an imperceptibly fast violence so deeply insinuated in the contemporary world 
that it is often barely registered. While trillions of tiny explosions still propel most of the 
global fleet of land-based vehicles, bigger but often unseen detonations continue to tear great 
volumes of rock fabric apart. Anthropocene geologists point out that anthropogenic mixing or 
“turbation” of rock fabric has so outstripped the impacts of any other organism that it has “no 
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analogue in the Earth’s 4.6 billion year history.”87 Again, Needham is prescient in 
appreciating the historical role of the fiery explosion in destratifying the Earth, citing Boyle’s 
observation that a “few barrels of gunpowder” suffices to blow up “many hundred, not to say 
thousand, tonnes of common rock.”88 By the mid-nineteenth century commercial application 
of gunpowder for mining and civil engineering had overtaken military uses. Chemist Alfred 
Nobel’s concoction of an explosive that was “more violent, brisant and shattering than 
propellant gunpowder” greatly accelerated this trend,89 and the dynamite industry, Kelly 
adds, “grew faster than any other business in history.”90  
This of course is not simply “anthropic” rock turbation but a very particular social 
interaction with geological formations – as we can glean from horror and outrage with which 
so many of the planet’s peoples have apprehended the western eagerness to turn the Earth 
inside out. But the traumatic history of Europe’s truncated encounter with gunpowder 
prompts us not simply to ask how its mighty earth-moving capabilities were achieved, but to 
consider the connections between lived exposure to explosive violence and the unprecedented 
intensity of the West’s drive to blast open the Earth. This question also relates to the social 
toleration of exceptional fatality rates of mine workers, both within Europe and its colonial 
extractive frontiers.  
Explosive extraction has disaggregated the Earth’s lithic strata to such a degree, 
geoscientists have observed, that it is unsettling the logic of superposition – the sequential 
lithic layering through which geologists conventionally interpret the Earth’s deep history.91 In 
this way, planetary changes triggered by a part of humanity undermine our very ability to 
make sense of the events scientists are attempting to measure and model. At the same time, 
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the power of the weaponized explosion has underpinned the global imposition of social and 
material relations that have eroded the capacity of many peoples worldwide to live with and 
respond to the changing conditions of their own environments.92  
While the planetary volatility that Anthropocene science seeks to substantiate may 
have begun to react back upon its own onto-epistemological surety, critical social thinkers 
allege that it has not yet impacted sufficiently to destabilize the geosciences’ assumption of 
global authority. In short, the Anthropocene geostory has yet to properly connect the physical 
violation of Earth systems and structures it documents with the epistemic violence that 
accompanies speaking on behalf of a world of exposed and marginalized others – a charge 
that may well be intensified by the choice of a radionuclide marker and the way this is 
presented. But the “earth-shattering” explosions that the Anthropocene hypothesis is 
foregrounding, I have argued, open up a history of fiery exothermic reactions, a genealogy 
which points to a deep, enduring entanglement of physical and epistemic violence in the 
becoming dominant of the West.  
We cannot replay European history without gunpowder. And perhaps Western 
thought itself still lacks the conceptual tools for making sense of the sudden arrival of a new 
kind of planetary combustion – not least because this thought is itself forged and scarred by 
the confrontation with an alien fire. Jacques Derrida writes of knowledge beginning from 
incomprehension and exposure: of “the wound or inspiration which opens every speech and 
makes possible every logos or every rationalism.”93 But some rationalisms, some epistemes, 
may be more scarred than others. Something deep, disturbing and persistent occurred when a 
strange new fire descended on European lands that had no sociocultural or cosmological 
niche for it. And if the coming of the anthropogenic explosion was indeed a geological event, 
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then learning to manage explosions otherwise, which must include managing with a lot fewer 
runaway exothermic events, might itself constitute another event in Earth history.  
